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The transportation of hazardous materials via pipelines is often considered a safer alternative to other 
transportation modalities such as railway, road and ship. However, pipelines often cross industrial and highly 
populated areas, so that their failure can pose a significant risk to the surrounding environment and the 
exposed population: the possible release of flammable and/or toxic materials in such areas can generate 
catastrophic events with very severe consequences. A number of accidents have actually occurred in the past 
years, and even when no deaths or injured are reported, significant damages to the surrounding environment 
often occur. This suggests that, given the extremely wide extension of the network worldwide, and the very 
high amounts of transported materials, a careful analysis is still required. In addition, the construction of 
pipelines also involves the contribution of expertise from a range of technical areas. As a consequence, the 
occurrence of accidents and the impact of their consequences, depend on the combination of a large number 
of parameters. In the present paper, an analysis of data relative to pipelines transporting hazardous materials 
has been carried out, and the influence of specific issues connected with their type and operation, has been 
assessed. 
1. Introduction 
Transportation of hazardous materials via pipeline is generally considered a safer alternative to other 
transportation methods, in particular railway and road. In a past analysis referred to oil transportation by 
different modalities (TRB, 2004), it was shown that, with the exception of tank and barge shipping, pipelines 
are the safest overall method in terms of failure rates, with the rate of fatalities, fires and explosions per ton-
mile of oil transported being typically between half and less than 1/10 those of other methods.  
Nonetheless, an accurate and detailed quantitative risk analysis of the transportation via pipelines is solicited 
for a number of reasons: 
• a significant portion of the pipelines under operation is getting old, and the corresponding frequency of 
accident/release is expected to increase; 
• pipelines often cross highly populated areas (often much denser than those crossed by rail and road 
transportation), so that even small releases can affect a large number of people; 
• citizens’ concern is continuously increasing. 
When a quantitative analysis has to be carried out, the typical Quantitative Risk Analysis methodologies 
commonly used for rail and road transport (Bubbico et al., 2004a; Bubbico et al., 2004b) must be properly 
modified to take into account the different characteristics of all these transportation modalities (Boot, 2013): 
• batch (rail/road) vs continuous (pipeline) mode; 
• different impact of auxiliary and often manual activities (e.g. loading/unloading); 
• impact of human reliability issues (e.g. tank driver); 
• etc. 
Due to the above considerations, in the recent years a number of studies were focused on the analysis of 
different aspects of the transport of hazardous materials via pipelines, as well as a number of additional duties 
have been required by public authorities and regulatory bodies to pipelines operators, such as reporting either 
major accidents or near misses. 
Based on data from 1970 to 1993, Golub et al. (1996) found out that most of the accidental releases from 
pipelines are caused by three event typologies: damages during excavation works, pipe material failure and 
corrosion, with 41 %, 28 % and 18 %, respectively. Damages during excavation were less frequent for deeper 
installations and the adoption of thicker pipes provided some benefit. In addition, the failure frequencies due to 
corrosion were estimated for different protection methods, i.e. with or without cathodic protection, and with or 
without insulation, obtaining the following figures: 8.7 10-5 #/km-y, 3.7 10-4 #/km-y, 1.1 10-4 #/km-y, and 2.5 10-
4 #/km-y, respectively. 
Kiefner et al. (2001), analysed data from 1985 until 1997 relative to gas and oil pipelines and found that the 
main accident causes were third parties activities (28.4 %), internal corrosion (12 %) and external corrosion 
(10 %). The trend with time showed that the number of accidents due to third parties activities gradually 
decreased probably thanks to more efficient control systems, such as the newly introduced Supervisory 
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, and to more severe regulations. Quantitatively, for pipe 
diameters up to 4”, the failure rate associated to third parties activities was estimated 6.3 10-5 #/km-y, while 
that for corrosion of pipes with insulation and cathodic protection was calculated as 9.7 10-6 #/km-y. 
Wang and Duncan (2014) analysed 35 serious accidents occurred between 1990 and 2009 involving natural 
gas pipelines, and found that: in 16 cases (46 %) a leak occurred with a frequency of 2.3 10-5 #/km-y; a full 
bore rupture was observed in 6 cases (17 %) with a frequency of 8.7 10-6 #/km-y, and in the remaining cases 
a release from valves, flanges, etc. was observed with 1.9 10-5 #/km-y. Overall, the failure rate for natural gas 
pipelines increased from 3.5 10-5 #/km-y in 1990 up to 9.5 10-5 #/km-y in 2005, the main causes of failure 
being corrosion (5.7 10-6 #/km-y) and materials deterioration (9.6 10-6 #/km-y), altogether summing up 86 % of 
all cases. 
In a report by US DOT published in 2010 (DOT, 2010), 493 cases occurred between 2005 and 2009 were 
analysed and classified as accidents involving dangerous liquids (305) and natural gas (188). For the first 
group, 30 % of the cases were caused by corrosion, 29 % by materials or welding failures and 23 % (71 
cases) by damages during excavation works. Slightly different results were found for natural gas pipelines, 
where the causes were: 28 % corrosion, 23 % materials failure and 20 % excavation damages. 
As far as European data are concerned, the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group regularly publishes 
reports collecting information on accidental releases from natural gas pipelines as provided by the most 
important European Companies. Based on 1309 accidents (EGIG, 2014), and on a total of 3.98 106 km-y, the 
overall accident frequency on the period 1970-2013 is 0.33 accidents every 1000 km, while it reduced to 0.16 
#/(1000 km) between 2008 and 2013. With reference to the causes, in 35 % of the cases external events were 
responsible for the release, corrosion for 24 %, material failure 16 % and excavation damages 13 %. These 
values look rather different than the US ones. 
Vianello and Maschio (2011) focused on the consequences of 1172 events involving natural gas pipelines 
across Europe from 1970 to 2007, with a frequency of 3.7 10-4 #/km-y. A catastrophic rupture of the pipeline 
was observed in 13 % of the cases (4.8 10-5 #/km-y), and in 87 % of the cases the release was attributable to 
a hole or similar configuration (3.2 10-4 #/km-y). Following the release, a flash fire occurred in 50.4 % of the 
cases (8 10-6 #/km-y), a fireball or jet fire in 30 % (4.8 10-6 #/km-y), while no consequences and vapor cloud 
explosion (VCE) occurred with a probability of 14 % (2.2 10-6 #/km-y) and 5.6 % (8.9 10-7 #/km-y), 
respectively. 
In a more recent analysis, also focused on the consequences possibly generated by a release of hazardous 
materials from pipelines (Bubbico et al., 2016), it was found that the type (pool fire, flash fire, etc.) and the 
frequency of occurrence of harmful consequences, markedly depended on the physical properties of the 
materials, and in particular, on its volatility. In 94 % of the cases involving low volatility liquids, no dangerous 
events were registered, while for compressed gases and pressure liquefied gases, a safe conclusion of the 
release was observed in only 38 % and 49 % of the cases, respectively; in addition, a catastrophic rupture is 
only possible for pressurized systems (pressure or liquefied gases, with 0.17 and 0.04 probability, 
respectively) while it was never observed for low volatility liquids. Similarly, in terms of dangerous phenomena, 
serious events occurred only with pressurized systems, while they were very rare for liquids (5 % for high 
volatility liquids). 
A statistical analysis of historical data has also been carried out to assess the influence of land use on the 
accident frequency characterizing pipelines for the transportation of hazardous materials (Ramírez-Camacho 
et al., 2017). In accordance with previous studies (with the exception of DOT, 2010), it was found that the 
main cause of accidental release is associated with third parties activities (external events) with about 38 % of 
the cases, followed by corrosion (21 %) and mechanical failure (20 %); in addition, ageing was claimed to play 
a significant role in the two latter causes. It was concluded that all stakeholders (owners, users and companies 
working in the surrounding area) must be involved to increase the level of safety of this kind of transportation. 
2. Types of pipelines 
A range of characteristics can be associated to pipelines, depending on a number of issues: the transported 
material, the location and type of origin and destination (e.g. off-shore or on-shore network, from source to 
process plants or from process plants to marketplace), the location of installation. Considering the most 
commonly transported materials, i.e. natural gas and crude oil, a typical classification of pipelines is described 
below: 
• flowlines connecting individual oil or gas wells to initial storage or processing facilities within the field; 
• gathering lines connecting field facilities to the main long-distance networks, the transmission line (see 
below); 
• transmission lines (longer and with larger diameters than the previous types) conveying oil to processing 
refineries and natural gas generally to urban distribution companies; 
• for natural gas, the distribution network (composed of smaller diameter pipelines) conveying the product 
to commercial, residential or industrial final users; 
• crude oil stops at refineries, while the processed petroleum products are subsequently transferred via the 
products pipeline system; 
• of course, besides compressed natural gas, crude oil, and its processed liquids (products), many other 
substances can be transported via pipeline: LNG, ammonia, and so on; the corresponding pipelines are 
generically classified as “other”. 
Oil flowlines generally travel short distances (from less than a km to a few kilometers), have small diameters 
(2” to 12”) and operate at relatively low pressures, typically below 7 barg. They usually end in tank farms, often 
including a three-phase separator (to separate oil, gas and water), and for this reason they are often defined 
as multiphase lines. In some cases, for crudes containing large amounts of salts or oils too viscous at low 
temperature, desalting or heating facilities are needed. 
Similarly to oil flowlines, gas flowlines transport gas from individual wells to processing facilities, to remove 
entrained unwanted materials such as water, acid gases, liquid hydrocarbons, hydrogen sulphide or carbon 
dioxide, which might also induce corrosion and other problems in the transportation lines and associated 
equipment. The length of individual flowlines varies depending on the capacity of the producing well: normally 
from less than a mile to a few miles, with diameters 2”-4”. The operating pressures can be higher than those 
for oil flowlines, up to about 20 barg. 
The gathering lines convey oil from field-processing and storage facilities to larger storage tanks, from which 
they are subsequently pumped into the long-distance main transmission line. Their diameter varies depending 
on the flow rate of crude, on pipeline length and other factors, while the operating pressure is normally higher 
than that of field flowlines. They are usually owned by the same pipeline company that manages the 
transmission line. 
Oil transmission lines move oil from large storage facilities to refineries or other storage terminals, with a wide 
variety of pipe sizes. Since they also cover quite long distances (several hundred miles, sometimes also 
crossing international borders), a number of pumping stations is required along the pipeline, to maintain the 
pressure and balance out friction losses, changes in elevation and other pressure losses. They are usually 
operated at higher pressures than the previous types and they require a complex and sophisticated monitoring 
and control system. 
Gas transmission lines also cover long distances with diameters up to 60” and usually operate at higher 
pressures than crude oil transmission lines, with compressors properly spaced along the line. As with oil lines, 
they are made of steel pipes and they are often buried below ground, with an external coating to protect them 
against corrosion. In the case of natural gas, for land transportation and long distances, the vapor phase 
transportation is preferred, whereas liquefied natural gas (LNG) is transported via transmission lines on 
shorter distances: in fact, even if liquid phase transportation would be advantageous in terms of pipe size 
because of the higher density, considerable problems of insulation and the need for cooling stations along the 
line would be introduced for longer distances; in addition, due to the low temperatures, special stainless steels 
would be required to avoid embrittlement. 
Gas distribution lines deliver natural gas to final customers and only refer to natural gas networks, 
representing last branch in the overall system. They operate at a lower pressure than the previous networks, 
but they cover most of the gas transportation total length. Pipe diameter ranges from 12 to 150 mm. They are 
usually owned by local distribution companies, starting from the so-called “citygate”, i.e. the delivery point 
where the natural gas is transferred from a transmission pipeline to the local gas utility. Starting from this gate, 
two different subsystems are commonly identified: 
• distribution main: a segment of pipeline installed to convey gas to individual service lines or other mains; 
• gas service line: the piping installed between a main pipeline, or other supply source,  and the metering 
system. 
Products pipelines are used to transport refined petroleum liquids or other chemicals from refineries and 
chemical plants to storages, other processing plants or distribution facilities. The products include gasoline, jet 
fuel, ammonia and other liquids such as liquefied petroleum gases (LPG), consequently in many cases these 
lines operate at higher pressures than crude oil transmission lines. Common diameter size varies from 8” to 
16”, but also smaller and larger lines can be found. Products pipelines can also move several different 
products in the same line (“batched” products transport). 
Other pipelines can transport a range of different hazardous materials including ammonia, chlorine, CO2, 
hydrogen, etc. Large quantities of ammonia are transferred from production sites to other process plants for 
producing a number of derivatives, such as nitric acid, ammonium nitrate, urea and others. Ammonia is 
usually transported as a liquefied gas, either refrigerated or pressurized, and, in a significant number of cases, 
pipelines cross public roads or other populated areas. 
Chlorine is also transported as a liquefied gas from the production site to plants for the manufacture of 
polyvinyl chlorine, polyurethane and polycarbonate plastics; however, differently from ammonia, in most of the 
cases, transportation takes place within the same company premises or to different companies located in the 
same industrial area. Only in few cases the pipeline is allowed to cross public areas roads. 
3. Data Analysis 
The information adopted for the analysis have been gathered from a number of public databases.  
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the US Department of 
Transportation (DOT), is in charge for research, development and control activities related with a total of about 
3106 km of pipelines used for the transportation of hazardous materials. It is also responsible for shipping 
activities of hazardous materials by road, plane and ship, for a total of about 1 million daily shipping. The 
database is yearly updated, and the data adopted for the present analysis (both accidents and total pipeline 
length) span over the period 2010 to 2015. 
All accidents involving the release of natural gas or oil from pipelines, independently of the amount released, 
must be reported in a standard form (“71002”) in accordance with the regulation when one of the following 
applies: 
• in the presence of fatalities or serious injuries requiring hospitalization; 
• damages to properties exceeding $ 50000, excluding released materials cost; 
• emergency shut-down of the plant; 
• any other event at operator’s discretion. 
The threshold of $ 50000 has not been changed since 1985, and for this reason, the number of accidents 
reported has increased significantly over the years. In addition the “71002” form has been occasionally 
modified (in 1984, 2002 and 2010) and only in the most recent version more detailed information is included 
so that a meaningful statistical analysis is possible. That’s the reason why the analysis starts from 2010. 
The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent investigation agency of the US 
Government in charge for the investigation of accidents connected with a wide range of transportation 
modalities (airplane, ship, railway, pipelines, etc.). The total number of reports is not very large, but the 
information reported is quite detailed, and therefore very useful for the analysis. 
The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board (TSB) is similar to NTSB, and 
investigates accidents occurred during transportation via ship, railway, oil and gas pipelines. Its Pipeline 
Occurrence Database System (PODS) is monthly updated and contains data starting from January 2004. 
A total of about 900 accident reports have been collected, but only 669 provided enough information for 
carrying out a meaningful analysis. In Figure 1, the total number of the collected accidents is represented, per 
type of hazardous material class and per year, for the years from 2010 to 2015. It can be seen that, as far as 
natural gas is concerned, a constant or even slightly decreasing trend can be observed, while for crude oil and 
other oil products a more constant trend is found, but with a noticeable increase in the correspondence of year 
2014. This latter increase is probably to be associated with a marked increase in the total length of operating 
pipelines (the “exposure”, expressed as km-y) occurred between 2013 and 2014 (see Table 1): in just one 
year an increase of about 14000 km (corresponding to 6 %) characterizes the crude oil transportation network, 
while about 3 %  is found for natural gas and oil products (namely, 3 % and 2.85 %, respectively). 
Table 1: Total length of pipelines, per type of transported material class (years 2010-2015) 
Length (km) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Oil pipelines  237416 240711 244478 244645 258333 264585 
Products pipelines  139834 139528 139185 140740 144298 147324 
Gas pipelines  2501166 2515970 2522003 2535003 2551334 2559848 
 Figure 1: Accidents distribution per transported material type, from 2010 to 2015 
The above considerations are better highlighted reporting the failure rate (accidents/km y), over the years 
(Table 2): 
Table 2: Failure rate from 2010 to 2015, per type of transported material class 
Failure rate (#/km-y) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Oil pipelines  8.42 10-5 9.14 10-5 7.36 10-5 9.81 10-5 1.59 10-4 9.83 10-5 
Products pipelines  1.86 10-4 1.79 10-4 1.58 10-4 2.06 10-4 2.43 10-4 1.76 10-4 
Gas pipelines  2.24 10-5 2.90 10-5 2.22 10-5 2.41 10-5 2.12 10-5 2.11 10-5 
The overall average value for all pipeline types (1.05 10-4 #/km-y) is in line with those reported by similar 
analyses (Hill, 1992), where values of 7.4 10-4 and 5.8 10-4 #/km-y are reported, based on data from 1983 to 
1991 by US-DOT and CONCAWE (European Oil Company Organization for Environment, Health and Safety), 
respectively. 
With reference to the classification of substances adopted above, the analysis also addressed the main 
causes of release as a function of various parameters. In Table 3, under the title “other external cause”, 
events such as automobile impact, sabotage, domino effects, etc., are included; “natural force” damage 
means floodings, earthquakes, and so on; all other classes are supposed to be already self-explanatory. A 
more detailed analysis covering a wider range of materials and based on a different database can be found in 
Ramírez-Camacho et al. (2017). 
The most frequent cause of pipe damage for crude oil is represented by corrosion (Table 3), with more than 
50% of the cases, followed by damages during excavation activities and, with much smaller frequencies, all 
other causes. 
Table 3: Release causes distribution per type of transported material class 
Cause Crude Oil Products Natural Gas 
 No. % No. % No. % 
Corrosion 76 54,7 37 27,6 17 10,9 
Equipment failure 6 4,3 8 6,0 3 1,9 
Excavation damage 26 18,7 33 24,6 76 48,7 
Incorrect operation 6 4,3 6 4,5 10 6,4 
Material failure 16 11,5 27 20,1 11 7,1 
Natural force 3 2,2 8 6,0 5 3,2 
Other incident cause 3 2,2 4 3,0 11 7,1 
Other external cause 3 2,2 11 8,2 23 14,7 
The large incidence of corrosion effects is compatible with the pipeline characteristics, since in almost all 
cases carbon steel was used for pipe manufacturing and in about 30 % of the cases no protection means 
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were adopted during pipeline operation; in 23 and 25 % of the cases insulation or cathodic protection were 
present, and only in the remaining 22 % a full protection method was implemented. Similar results are also 
obtained for oil products: in about 90 % of the cases, carbon steel was used as pipe material and in 53 % of 
those cases, no kind of corrosion protection or just simple insulation was used. Excavation damages become 
the first cause of release for natural gas pipelines, with other outside forces being the second one, and a 
relatively more homogeneous distribution is found for other oil products (with “corrosion”, “excavation damage” 
and “equipment failures” representing more than 90 % of the cases). These results are in good agreement 
with previous studies (Hansler et al., 2011; Ramírez-Camacho et al., 2017). The reduced influence of 
corrosion in the case of natural gas is due to a combination of reasons: in a very limited number of cases 
carbon steel was adopted (about 7 %), replaced by stainless steel in more than 40 %; in addition, the frequent 
use of plastic materials for the pipes and the consequent absence of insulation, make the pipe more sensitive 
to mechanical damages. 
4. Conclusions 
In the paper, a historical analysis of recent data about accidents occurred during transportation of hazardous 
materials via pipeline is reported. It has been found that, despite the continuous increase in the total length of 
pipelines installed all over the world, a constant or even decreasing frequency of release is globally observed, 
especially for natural gas. The main causes of release, for each type of material transported, have also been 
identified and quantified in terms of relative occurrence: the main cause of release was found to be corrosion 
for crude oil (more than 50 %), and excavation damages for natural gas (around 49 %), while a more uniform 
distribution was observed for the generic class of oil products. The presented results might be of help in 
suggesting the adoption of proper prevention and/or protection actions to be implemented for a safer 
transportation of hazardous materials via pipelines. 
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